GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES

FALL 2011

Reid Road Municipal Utility District v. Speedy Stop Food Stores, 337 S.W.3d 846 (Tex. 2011)

Condemnation – “Property Owner Rule” Applied to Entities: In a condemnation action brought by a municipal utility district for an easement on property owned by a limited partnership, the partnership filed objections to the special commissioners’ determination of just compensation. The trial court granted a no-evidence summary judgment to the district, striking the affidavit of an officer of the partnership’s corporate general partner which gave the officer’s opinion as to the reduced value of the property as a result of being burdened by the easement. The “Property Owner Rule” provided, generally, that a property owner was qualified to testify to the value of her property even if she was not an expert and would not be qualified to testify to the value of other property. Prior authority had held that an agent of an entity-owner could not testify to the value of the property of such entity unless he first qualified as an expert. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Property Owner Rule applied to corporate entities. Held: Affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the better rule was to treat organizations the same as natural persons for purposes of the Property Owner Rule, with certain restrictions on whose testimony can be considered as that of the property owner. The Supreme Court limited the Property Owner Rule, as applied to entities, to officers of the entity in managerial positions with duties related to the property, or employees of the entity with substantially equivalent positions and duties. The Supreme Court declared that the Property Owner Rule fell within the ambit of Texas Rule of Evidence 701 and therefore did not relieve the entity-owner of the requirement that a witness must be personally familiar with the property and its fair market value; but the Property Owner rule created a presumption as to both.

City of Houston v. Williams, WL 923980; LEXIS 229 (Tex. 2011)

Governmental Immunity – Waiver Based on Unilateral Contract Created by Official Act of Governmental Entity: The City of Houston adopted ordinances which provided certain benefits to its firefighters upon performance by the firefighters of certain criteria. § 271.152 of the Texas Local Government Code, under certain circumstances, waived governmental immunity for suits alleging breach of a written contract. The firefighters alleged wrongful underpayment of lump sums due as a result of the ordinances upon termination of their employment, but the City claimed the suit was barred by governmental immunity. Held: The ordinances constituted written contracts within the scope of § 271.152 because, among other elements, the ordinances “were duly enacted by the City with the intent to be bound.” Therefore, because the “contract” was in writing, stated the essential terms of the agreement, provided for services to the local governmental entity, and was duly enacted, the ordinances constituted unilateral contracts and met § 271.152’s waiver of immunity.

Travis Central Appraisal District v. Norman, 342 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. 2011)

Workers’ Compensation – Anti-Retaliation Law Does Not Waive Political Subdivision’s Immunity for Retaliatory Discharge Claims: A former employee brought retaliatory-discharge claim action against her former employer, a political subdivision of the state, alleging that she was fired for filing a workers’ compensation claim. The trial court denied the former employer’s plea to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed. Held: Reversed. The Texas Anti-Retaliation Law, found in Chapter 451 of the Texas Labor Code, prohibited an employer from discharging or discriminating against an employee, who in good faith filed a workers’ compensation claim. Unquestionably, the law applied to private employers. The Supreme Court had previously held it to applied to the state’s political subdivisions through Chapter 504 of the Labor Code. See City of LaPorte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288, 298-99 (Tex. 1995). However, as a result of amendments to Chapter 504 subsequent to the Supreme Court’s holding in Barfield, Chapter 504 no longer waived immunity for retaliatory discharge claims under Chapter 451. Therefore, a retaliatory discharge claim, asserting a termination for pursuing a claim for workers’ compensation, may not be brought against the state’s political subdivisions.

Roccaforte v. Jefferson County, 341 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. 2011)

Suit Against County – Requirement of Notice to County by Mail Not Jurisdictional – Hand-delivery Sufficient: The Local Government Code required a person suing a county to give the county judge and the county or district attorney notice of the claim. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 89.0041. The plaintiff provided that notice, but did so by personal service, rather than registered or certified mail as the statute contemplated. After the jury returned a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor, the county moved for judgment, alleging that the plaintiff’s failure to notify the county of the suit by registered or certified mail mandated dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit against the county. The court of appeals affirmed. Held: Reversed. The appropriate county officials received timely notice of the suit and § 89.0041 was not a prerequisite to suit, but was a provision which could be waived by the county. As such, it could never be a jurisdictional requirement.